



#### TECHNOLOGY DRIVEN. WARFIGHTER FOCUSED.

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**Report Documentation Page** 

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# Power & Energy SIL




#### P&E SIL



- Series Hybridelectric power system
- Laboratory based evaluation of design alternatives
- Driven by automated controller
- Requires a-priori duty cycle






Hermit (DCE3)






# RDECOM SIL HWIL and Driver-in-the-Loop Layout










# P&E-SIL – Automation of Code **Generation and Integration**








## RDECOM Simulation Design - Power System



- Model: GVSL
  - Assumptions: SS torque transfer in gear train,
  - Current Power Systems: 420kW Engine, 410kW Generator, 500kW Battery (consistent with 24-ton FCS-like vehicle)
- Blocks:
  - - Inputs from the Vehicle
  - Output
    - Outputs to the Vehicle
  - High Voltage Powertrain & Energy Storage
    - CHPSPerf- Engine, Generator, & Battery
    - 420kW Turbo-Diesel Engine/ 410kWGenerator
    - Li-Ion Battery direct connected to 510V Bus
    - **Dump Resistor**
    - Turret Azimuth & Gun Elevation Motors
  - **Drive System** 
    - Independent Left/Right Motors (ILR), transmission, & brakes
    - Gears include Coulombic, Viscous, and Mesh gear losses
  - **Energy Management** 
    - Power Generation and Motor controllers (translates commanded torques to machine torques)
  - Driver
    - Speed-based mobility control (throttle/steer commands to torque commands) for low vehicle speeds
    - Torque-based mobility control for high vehicle speeds
    - Blended mobility control for mid vehicle speeds
  - Low Voltage (Fan/Aux)
- Input File gvsl\_Input.m defines input parameters






#### Links with shared workspace with the vehicle module

#### Input Block:

- Commands/States from vehicle model: accel, brake, steer, gun azimuth/elevation, gun trigger, EMA, speeds/rates (vehicle, track, sprocket, turret azimuth/elevation, steer), gear, aux. loads
- Includes speed sign management for neutral and reverse

#### Output Block:

- Power outputs (propulsion & turret motor torques, sprocket & brake torques, mean & delta torque, fan/battery current & voltage, generator & dump resistor current, PFN voltage, Aux system current), fuel, engine speed, battery SOC, EMA/gun readiness, Left & Right MOIs, gear.
- Includes torque sign management for neutral and reverse






#### **RDECOM** Safety & Communications



RemoteLink Internet ICD, v1.11

GVSI Warren MT



udp ports 5115, 5116

VehModelFaults > 0 for Inf or NaN trapped on inputs/outputs, max speed or Euler angle exceeded

#### **GVSL** out

52 floats, 208 bytes

Net .	$\begin{cases} \\ \end{cases}$	38	sim_time_gvsl (s)
		39	sim_time_sil (s)
		40	round trip delay gvsl (s)
		41	round trip delay sil (s)
		42	GVSL_out update rate at SIL (Hz)
	L	43	SIL_out update rate at GVSL (Hz)
Health Status		50	Veh_dynamics_up (0/1)
	4	51	Power_system_SC_up (0/1)
		52	ESS_up (0/1)
			-

## SIL\_out

104 floats, 116 bytes

sim_time_gvsl (s)		
sim_time_sil (s)		
round trip delay gvsl (s)	l	Net
round trip delay sil (s)	١٢	QOS
GVSL_out update rate at SIL (Hz)		
SIL_out update rate at GVSL (Hz)	ノ	
VMS/veh dyn Status (0/1)	1	Health
HWIL Status (0/1)	}	
SC Status (0/1)	J	Status
	sim_time_sil (s) round trip delay gvsl (s) round trip delay sil (s) GVSL_out update rate at SIL (Hz) SIL_out update rate at GVSL (Hz) VMS/veh dyn Status (0/1) HWIL Status (0/1)	sim_time_sil (s) round trip delay gvsl (s) round trip delay sil (s) GVSL_out update rate at SIL (Hz) SIL_out update rate at GVSL (Hz) VMS/veh dyn Status (0/1) HWIL Status (0/1)

#### Initiate SIL HW shutdown if any below are TRUE:

- GVSL\_Veh\_Dyn\_up ==0
- GVSL Pwr Sys SC up == 0
- GVSL\_ESS\_up ==0
- •Net data delay > 10s == 1

SIL San Jose Ca

dp ports 5100, 5101



#### Signal SIL HW health with:

- •SIL\_Veh\_Dyn\_Faults == 0
- •SIL HWIL Faults
- •SIL SC Faults ==0



#### **RDECOM** Motion Base Simulators



- Man-rated motion base simulator
- Integrated immersive simulation environment
- Real-time vehicle model
- Integrated CAT Crewstation
- Ideal facility for capturing soldier behavior (i.e. duty cycles)



















## **Duty Cycle Motivation**



- The Power & Energy SIL in Santa Clara, CA.
  - Series hybrid electric power system
  - Mobility loads:
    - Traction drive motors
  - Non-mobility loads:
    - Constant on/off loads
    - Time varying loads
    - Pulse power loads
- Non-mobility and mobility loads need to share the available power.
- What is the impact of power management choices?
- How should components be sized?
- Simple drive cycles were inadequate.
- → Need a relevant Duty Cycle







# RDECOM Duty Cycle Experiment 2




- 12 trained Army driver/gunner subjects
- 13 km route
- Avg 42 minutes driving
- Grades greater than 30%
- 7 engagements with OneSAF opposition force infantry and vehicles








Duty Cycle Experiment 2 (DCE2): June 2006



• Duty Cycle Experiment 3 (DCE3): June 2007



• ILIR: FY08






#### **Long Haul Motivation**




- Geographically disbursed.
- High-fidelity.
- Integration improves fidelity of experiments.
- Dynamical systems, the RMS and P&E SIL like tight loops. Substantial delays introduce instabilities.




2,450 Miles by Roads 2,080 Miles by Direct Route







 Remote location of power system is transparent to the operators.











#### Interconnections
















- Series Hybrid Power System for MCS
- Independent Left/Right
- Diesel Engine/Generator
- 600 V bus w/Battery
- Two 300kW traction motors.
- Includes thermal model
- Implemented in graphical modeling tool and converted to real-time code.









#### **Vehicle Dynamics and Terrain**



- Implemented in Dynamics Modeling Tool
- Receives Torque
- Outputs
  - Speed
  - Motion
- Integrates its own states








- Implemented in Hardware
- Receives
  - **Driver Commands**
  - Speed
- **Outputs Torques**
- **Dynamometers** serve as vehicle proxy
- Hardware contains implicit dynamics


Speeds

Torques





# **DCE Top Level Design**





#### **Communication Channel Choice**



# Modem (56k bps)

- Analog/Digital
- Dedicated channel
- Connection-based
- Reliable
- No firewall
- Noise-based corruption
- ~350 ms round trip
- 1.4% loss rate

#### Internet

- Digital
- No dedicated channel
- Packet-based
- Moderately Reliable
- Firewall configuration required
- Dropped packets
- ~94 ms round trip
- 0.1% loss rate



#### **Protocol Choice**




# TCP $\Delta t$ ? D

- (Virtual) Connection
- Stream
- Reliable

# UDP $\Delta t = \underline{D}$

- Connectionless
- Packet
- Unreliable






#### **UDP** Performance




- Round trip times
  - 78 ms to 188 ms
  - Most at 94 ms
  - Limit 26 ms
- 209 packets dropped
- Vehicle dynamics ~2 ms
- SIL ~10 ms

- Problems
  - Substantial delay
  - Delay jitter
  - Data loss



D is a random variable






#### **Design A – Naïve Approach**




- Delay > Dynamics
- Delay > SIL
- Simulator response
  - Driver → Motion
  - Increased by 2D
- Safety risk to driver
- Damage risk to SIL
- Experimental quality degraded
- Potential instabilities





#### **Design B – Parallel Simulations**







## **Design B – Evaluation**




#### Pros

- SIL will receive proper commands delayed by D
- Immediate response
- The GVSL and SIL are not coupled

#### Cons


- The power train model does not exactly match the SIL
- The GVSL and the SIL will tend to drift apart over time.





### **Design C – Observers**








### **Design C – Vehicle dynamics**






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#### Design C - Vehicle Observer








# Vehicle Observer – Direct ("Skyhook")




- Imposes an artificial force on the vehicle
- Used to track
  - Lateral position
  - Heading
  - Sprocket speed





# Vehicle Observer – Indirect ("Augmented Input")








#### **Design C – Power train dynamics**





$$\mathbf{u}_{k}^{s} = \begin{bmatrix} t \\ s \\ b \end{bmatrix} \qquad \mathbf{x}^{s} = \mathbf{f}^{s} \left( \mathbf{x}^{s}, \mathbf{\omega}^{s}, \mathbf{u}^{s} \right)$$

$$\mathbf{v}_{k}^{s} = \begin{bmatrix} \omega_{L} \\ \omega_{R} \end{bmatrix} \qquad \mathbf{v}^{s} = \mathbf{h}^{s} \left( \mathbf{x}^{s}, \mathbf{v}^{s}, \mathbf{v}^{s}, \mathbf{v}^{s} \right)$$

$$\mathbf{v}^{s} = \mathbf{h}^{s} \left( \mathbf{x}^{s}, \mathbf{v}^{s}, \mathbf{v}^{s}, \mathbf{v}^{s} \right)$$

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
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#### **Design C – Power Train Observer**







## **Design C – Evaluation**




#### Pros

- States should track
- Delay is approximately negated in vehicle error

#### Cons


- Delay is approximately doubled in power train error
- Error contains time skew





# Design D – Delay Compensation








# Design D – Power Train Observer Delay Compensation







# **Design D – Evaluation**




### Pros

Unbiased estimate of the error

### Cons


- Does not account for variance in delay (jitter).
- Does not account for data loss.





#### Power Train Observer (un-skewed, robust)





### **The Correction Term**




- Ideas from sliding mode control were used to define the correction term.
- We used the sliding surface

$$s = \left(\frac{d}{dt} + \lambda\right)e$$

for some degree of freedom .

- We then devise a controller to drive *s* to 0.
- Our control action targets the acceleration terms of x
- We use the "robust" term of the SMC with a transition region to avoid chattering.





### **Aggressiveness of Control**



- $\mathbf{p}^{\nu}(\mathbf{e}_{k}^{\nu})$  directly affects state rates.
- States are fully accessible (via rates).
- If allowed, may directly manipulate states.
- It is best to manipulate states in a rational way (i.e., IAW non-holonomic constraints)
- It is best to allow the correction term to gently keep system on track.
- Allow forward dynamics to provide instantaneous response.

o provide 
$$\mathbf{y}_{j}^{v} + \mathbf{p}_{k}^{v}$$

$$\mathbf{x}_{k}^{v} = \mathbf{f}^{v} \left( \mathbf{x}^{v}, \mathbf{\tau}^{v} \right) + \mathbf{p}^{v} (\mathbf{e}_{k}^{v}) \qquad \mathbf{\hat{y}}_{k}^{v}$$

$$\mathbf{y}^{v} = \mathbf{h}^{v} (\mathbf{x}^{v})$$



### **Leaked Energy**



- $\mathbf{p}^{\nu}(\mathbf{e}_{k}^{\nu})$  imposes an artificial "force" on the vehicle
- It affects the location and velocity.
- Ideally  $\mathbf{f}^{\nu}(\mathbf{x}^{\nu}, \boldsymbol{\tau}^{\nu}) = \mathbf{p}^{\nu}(\mathbf{e}_{k}^{\nu})$
- If  $\mathbf{p}^{\nu}$  affects only acceleration terms then  $\mathbf{v}^{T}\mathbf{p}^{\nu}$  is an energy like term (normalized to unit mass).
- The correction term adds/subtracts energy from the system; it does work.
- We use

$$\int_{0}^{t} \mathbf{v}^{T} \mathbf{p}^{v} d\tau$$

to measure the accuracy of the observer.

nergy 
$$\mathbf{y}_{j}^{v}$$
 +  $\mathbf{\hat{p}}_{k}^{v}$   $\mathbf{\hat{q}}_{k}^{v}$   $\mathbf{\hat{q}}_{k}^{v}$   $\mathbf{\hat{q}}_{k}^{v}$   $\mathbf{\hat{q}}_{k}^{v}$   $\mathbf{\hat{q}}_{k}^{v}$   $\mathbf{\hat{q}}_{k}^{v}$   $\mathbf{\hat{q}}_{k}^{v}$   $\mathbf{\hat{q}}_{k}^{v}$ 



### **Safety Robustness**




- Both TARDEC and SIL have parallel simulations running.
- Only TARDEC has human operator.
- Both sides set thresholds on state convergence error.
- If threshold is exceeded, the SIL is dropped off line and TARDEC continues.
- Additionally, health flags are sent back and forth regarding major system readiness.



### Design E – Local Observers








### **Driver commands and SC errors**








# Time Delay








# **Artificial inputs**








### **Driver commands and SC errors**








# **Artificial inputs**








# **SIL Performance**









The only large state convergence errors occurred during either a significant time delay or an extreme driving event.

Leaked mobility energy: Less than 3% of total input energy

Leaked powertrain energy: Less than 2% of total input energy

Turret/Gun errors: Less than 10 degrees


Bus voltage errors: Less than 80 volts

Driver didn't notice any SC-induced oscillations



# **Continuing Work**






Map Courtesy of Google™ Maps



# **Observer Free Approach**








# **Description: Approach**



- Each lab executes its respective real-time thread
  - Real-time thread executes in the time domain, t
  - Non-blocking communications initiate events in the sample domain, s
- Do not allow data to accumulate in queue.
- Events are driven by sending and arrival of packets.
- Each update has a limited effect with regard to time.





### **Description: Development plan**




- Model-based internet integration with the actual engine
  - Preview added to driver model.
- Replace internet model with LAN
- Replace LAN with internet
- Replace VESIM vehicle with TARDEC vehicle
  - Increased transmission damping (ζ≈0.014)
  - Scaled engine by 50%
  - Redesigned driveline
  - Increased delay (up to 5x)
- Bring in the Motion Simulator



# **Description: Experiment**



- 4 different drivers
- 2 different delay conditions
  - 25 ms
  - 125 ms
- 2 different closed courses at Aberdeen
  - Munson SFC
  - Churchville B





# Results: Internet Delay Benchmark



